Regional Overview
Asia-Pacific
June 2025

India: The state escalates its campaign against Naxal-Maoist rebels 

On 21 May, Indian security forces killed the general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI (Maoist)), the highest-ranking leader to have ever been killed in combat, in Chhattisgarh’s Abujhmarh forest alongside at least 26 other CPI (Maoist) members. The recent clashes formed part of an overall rise in clashes between Indian security forces and Naxal-Maoist cadres. The escalation is the result of a 21-day anti-militancy operation in the Karegutta hills, a militant stronghold on the Chhattisgarh-Telangana border.¹Rahul Devulapalli, “Operation Kagar: All about the Karregutta hills where central forces are sweeping a Maoists stronghold,” Week (India), 2 May 2025 The operation concluded on 11 May and resulted in the reported deaths of 31 Naxal-Maoist cadres. The campaign, dubbed Operation Kagar, was launched in January 2024 by Indian Home Minister Amit Shah with the objective of eradicating “left-wing extremism” by 31 March 2026.²Press Information Bureau, “Achieving a historic success in the resolve of a ‘Naxal-free India’, security forces kill 31 Naxalites in the biggest-ever operation against Naxalism at Karreguttalu Hill (KGH) on Chhattisgarh-Telangana border,” 14 May 2025; Hindustan Times, “Shah vows to end Naxalism by March 2026: Which are the Left-Wing Extremism-affected districts?” 1 April 2025 

The death of the CPI (Maoist) general secretary is likely to prompt a reassessment of the group’s future strategies³Snigdhendu Bhattacharya, “India’s War Against Maoist Rebels Reaches Decisive Point,” Diplomat, 29 May 2025 and may lead to retaliatory acts of violence targeting civilians suspected of being state collaborators in the short term, a trend seen in the aftermath of previous successful anti-militancy operations. Tribal people, who are the primary inhabitants of the Red Corridor, have long found themselves in the crosshairs of the conflict. Human rights groups have accused the government of subjecting them to gross human rights violations during previous anti-militancy operations.⁴People’s Union for Democratic Rights, “Thirteen Months of Kagaar: Securitization and Human Rights in Chhattisgarh,” 10 February 2025

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Indonesia: Violence in Papua hits a year-high

Violence in Papua has reached its highest levels this year, driven by an escalation in fighting between the military and the separatist West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB). ACLED records 29 clashes between the TPNPB and Indonesian security forces in May, compared to six the previous month. Fighting escalated in Central Papua, where clashes took place in eight villages across Sugapa and Hitadipa districts between 13 and 14 May. While the main target was TPNPB members, Indonesian soldiers were accused of attacking civilians during the fight, raiding churches, and dropping bombs.⁵Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: Renewed Fighting Threatens West Papua Civilians,” 29 May 2025 According to various sources, at least four rebels and three locals were killed, including a village head and a priest. Eleven others were injured or went missing, and hundreds of people fled their houses.⁶Suara Papua, “Hundreds of people from three villages in Hitadipa district fled to Sugapa district,” 19 May 2005 (Indonesian) State forces claimed to have killed 18 rebels during the clashes.⁷Hengky Yeimo, “Indonesian military claimed to kill 18 OPM members, TPNPB denied it, what really happened in Intan Jaya?” Jubi, 21 May 2025 (Indonesian) In a separate operation, authorities also killed the local TPNPB leader for Yambi. In total, at least 20 people, mostly rebels and civilians, were killed in May.

Papua has experienced a significant growth in political violence in recent years, with 2024 and 2023 being the most violent years since ACLED’s coverage of Indonesia began in 2015. Last year, the military formed the Habema Operation Command to oversee combat operations and engage in other counterinsurgency and negotiation initiatives in the region. The task force mainly operates in the central highlands, including the Wabu Block gold mine area, and has been involved in recent clashes.⁸Nawir Arsyad Akbar, “Getting to know the TNI Habema Task Force that killed 18 OPM members in Sugapa,” Kompas, 16 May 2025 (Indonesian)

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India/Pakistan: A four-day conflict draws to a close amid drone and missile warfare

Tensions between India and Pakistan boiled over in May, as the two countries engaged in some of the most intense and widespread fighting seen in recent decades. In response to the 22 April Pahalgam militant attack, which India accused Pakistan of orchestrating, India conducted drone and missile strikes targeting several sites India alleged were occupied by militants within Pakistan in the early hours of 7 May. They also targeted the reported headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad groups in Pakistani Punjab. Pakistan initially retaliated by shooting down multiple Indian aircraft. Over the next three days, intense fighting involving artillery and mortars erupted along the Line of Control (LoC) separating the Indian- and Pakistani-administered parts of Kashmir. 

The situation escalated on 9 May, when Pakistan officially launched its counter-operation, attacking military bases within India, including with short and long-range ballistic missiles. ACLED records eight successfully executed airstrikes in Indian-administered Kashmir, Gujarat, and Punjab.⁹ACLED counts the number of “airstrike events,” rather than individual airstrikes. Per ACLED methodology, when several strikes hit the same location on the same day, they are coded as one event in the dataset. See the ACLED Codebook for more details. In response, India carried out 11 airstrikes, mainly targeting Pakistan Air Force infrastructure, including near the capital city of Islamabad. This escalation prompted diplomatic intervention from the United States, eventually leading to the cessation of hostilities that claimed dozens of lives over the four days, predominantly from fighting along the LoC.¹⁰David E. Sanger et al., “Reluctant at First, Trump Officials Intervened in South Asia as Nuclear Fears Grew,” The New York Times, 10 May 2025 Beyond the disputed Kashmir region, drone and missile warfare affected seven states and union territories within India and two provinces in Pakistan. The overwhelming majority of these drone and missile attacks were intercepted by air defense systems between 7 and 10 May.

The ceasefire largely appears to be holding. As of 30 May, ACLED records only two clashes between the two countries’ militaries after its announcement on 10 May. However, the threat of future escalation persists as militancy continues unabated in Kashmir, where ACLED data show six events involving militants in May since the ceasefire. On 12 May, in his first remarks after the ceasefire, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to respond militarily to future acts of “terrorism,” eschewing distinctions between “masterminds of terrorism” and their alleged state sponsors.¹¹Press Information Bureau, “English rendering of PM’s address to the Nation,” 12 May 2025 

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Myanmar: ​​The Assam Rifles kill 10 Myanmar resistance fighters along the India-Myanmar border

On 14 May, India’s Assam Rifles (AR) killed 10 members of the Tamu People’s Defense Organization (Tamu PDO), a resistance group under Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG), near Tamu on the India-Myanmar border. This is the first instance of such lethal cross-border violence involving AR since the coup, although ACLED records at least four armed clashes in Tamu between Myanmar resistance forces and Indian insurgent groups since 2021. The AR is a paramilitary force under the Indian army responsible for border security in the area. It has been accused of extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses in the past.¹²K Sarojkumar Sharma, “Manorama, Irom face of anti-AFSPA protest,” The Times of India, 9 July 2016 The AR claimed it acted upon intelligence and retaliated tactically after its troops came under fire. It described the killings as the “biggest” counter-insurgency operation in recent years.¹³Rjeev Bhattacharyya, “Indian Security Forces Massacre Burmese Resistance Functionaries,” The Diplomat, 20 May 2025 The NUG, in contrast, claimed that its fighters were apprehended by the AR inside Myanmar territory, forcibly taken across the border into India, tortured, and killed based on signs of torture on the victim’s bodies and its own investigations.¹⁴The National Unity Government, “Statement on the Killing of 10 Members of People’s Defence Organization in Tamu District in the Indo-Myanmar Border,” 26 May 2025

The violence occurred after the Tamu PDO relocated from Khampat town to somewhere near milepost 59 on the border with India in the west of Kamma Gyi village.¹⁵Myanmar Now, “NUG calls on India to investigate killing of Myanmar resistance fighters,” 22 May 2025 Territorial disputes have been simmering since India began fencing its 1,643-kilometer shared border with Myanmar in June 2022. Resistance forces based in Tamu claimed Indian fence construction encroaches on Myanmar territory in six areas and opposed the plan, particularly near mileposts 81, 82, 74, 75, and 76.¹⁶X @TheChindwin, 17 May 2025; Khonumthung News, “Proposed Indian Border Fence Will Encroach Into Myanmar,” Burma News International, 13 May 2025; Myanmar Now, “NUG calls on India to investigate killing of Myanmar resistance fighters,” 22 May 2025; Karishma Hasnat, “Myanmar’s NUG Identifies Those Killed at Border as its Members, Calls for Probe,” The Wire, 21 May 2025 The Indian government also declared last year that it would cancel the Free Movement Regime between the two countries.¹⁷Vijaita Singh, “Centre yet to formally scrap Free Movement Regime with Myanmar,” The Hindu, 26 December 2024

Following the 14 May violence, the NUG demanded that the Indian government halt unilateral border fencing, while family members of the deceased Tamu PDO members and local communities protested and called for accountability.¹⁸Network Media Group, “Protest Over Indian Army Murders of PDF members,” Burma News International, 28 May 2025 Refugees and border residents have voiced fears of deteriorating security in the area and the potential for the AR’s killings to lead to further tensions between armed groups in the area, where rebel groups of Myanmar and Indian origin regularly cross in both directions.¹⁹Yashraj Sharma, “‘Everyone feels unsafe’: Border panic as Indian forces kill Myanmar rebels,” Aljazeera, 2 June 2025

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Pakistan: Baloch separatist activity escalates further as Pakistan accuses India of waging a proxy war

In May, separatist violence in Pakistan’s Balochistan province increased in frequency and deadliness, with an around 60% rise in incidents compared to April. Between 9 and 10 May, militants, mainly from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), enforced roadblocks and launched coordinated attacks against security forces in seven districts of the province, coinciding with Pakistan’s ongoing clashes with India along its eastern border. The BLA publicly offered support to India, expressing a willingness to increase pressure on Pakistan’s military, which it regards as an occupying force, along its western borders at the same time.²⁰The Balochistan Post, “BLA Declares ‘New Order Inevitable’, Offers to Join Military Offensive Against Pakistan,” 11 May 2025 In a provocative attack on 14 May, BLA militants threw a grenade at a rally organized to honor Pakistan’s army after its conflict with India. A week later, on 21 May, a suspected BLA suicide bombing on an army public school bus in Khuzdar district reportedly killed 10 people, including eight students.

Pakistan has long accused India of fomenting Baloch separatism, an echo of allegations made by India against Pakistan with regard to Kashmir.²¹Azadeh Moshiri, “School bus attack caught in tensions between Pakistan and India,” BBC News, 25 May 2025 These claims became more prominent in May as a result of the deteriorating relations between the two countries and the symbolic timing and targets of recent separatist attacks. As links between Baloch separatist groups and India are drawn more explicitly, Pakistan’s security forces may use this narrative to justify an intensified crackdown, not only on militants but also on the broader ethnic Baloch population, which already suffers from systemic human rights abuses at the hands of the state.²²Azadeh Moshiri, “School bus attack caught in tensions between Pakistan and India,” BBC News, 25 May 2025

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Philippines: ​​Election violence grips Bangsamoro amid Marcos vs. Duterte midterm showdown 

The Philippines saw a surge in political violence in May, largely driven by violent incidents related to the nationwide midterm polls held on 12 May. The 45-day period between the start of the local campaigning period on 28 March and election day on 12 May saw around a 45% increase in political violence across the country, compared to the 45-day period prior. Election-related violence peaked on election day itself, accounting for 35% of such events recorded by ACLED since 1 October 2024, the start of the election candidacy filing period.

A disproportionate share of the violence took place in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The BARMM ranks first among the country’s 18 regions with a 42% share of all political violence from 28 March to 12 May. On election day, three supporters of a mayoral candidate were killed in a firefight between seaborne police patrollers and an unidentified armed group traveling by boat along the waters of Hadji Muhtamad town in Basilan, BARMM. A day earlier, a firefight between supporters of rival mayoral candidates in Hadji Mohammad Ajul town in Basilan, BARMM, resulted in the death of four, in the election week’s deadliest event. The firefight also involved clans caught in rido, a local type of war between clans, highlighting rido’s continued threat in the lead-up to the first-ever BARMM parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2025. Despite these incidents, the Philippine National Police judged the election to be “generally peaceful.”²³Luisa Cabato, “PNP: 2025 midterm elections ‘generally peaceful,’” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 May 2025 

Nationally, voters’ attention was on the race for 12 senate positions touted as a showdown between the Marcos and Duterte families, whose alliance-turned-feud climaxed when President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. allowed his predecessor, former President Rodrigo Duterte, to be arrested and brought to The Hague in March on the back of an International Criminal Court warrant for crimes related to the latter’s war on drugs. Observers have largely seen the election results as favorable to the Dutertes. Enough Duterte allies won — including the senatorial candidate with the most votes — to likely ward off an ongoing impeachment complaint against Vice President Sara Duterte, who is considered a strong contender for the 2028 presidential election. That said, a successful impeachment would bar her from running for president.

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